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How should scientific advice be incor-
porated into the political decisionmaking
process? Even experts can’t keep up with
the torrent of studies published in their
own field, and, supposedly, scientific
issues—from climate change to biodiver-
sity loss—have obvious political compo-
nents. How is advice treated in an age
when experts are increasingly viewed with
suspicion and distrust?
The Paradox of Scientific Authority: The Role
of Scientific Advice in Democracies, by Wiebe E
Bijker, Roland Bal, and Ruud Hendriks,
reveals the political decision-making in
a study of the inner workings of the
‘‘Gezondheidsraad,’’ a scientific advisory
body to the Dutch government. Dutch
officials invited Bijker et al. to observe the
process and write their account, which was
eventually presented to Queen Beatrix.
So, it is one of those instances—these days
growing in number—where the once-
reviled sociologists are being asked to help
the powerful understand the relationship
between policy and science. The authors
are well aware of the problems posed for
their objectivity—both actual and per-
ceived—by this dangerous shift from
outsider to insider.
The paradox referred to in the title has
its roots in the fact that scientific advice-
giving committees are generally called
upon to fulfill their most important role
just at the point when scientific knowledge
is at its least certain; if we were all certain
about some piece of science and technol-
ogy, then there would be no need for any
committee structure and we would just do
what was natural, like putting insulation
on high-voltage wires in the home. The
paradox is reinforced, according the
authors, by the fact that the prestige of
science has rarely been so low. They say,
‘‘The aim of this book is to contribute to a
theory of scientific advising in which the
paradox is resolved.’’ (p 1)
It would all be so simple if, as under
what they call the ‘‘standard model,’’ there
was science on the one hand and policy on
the other. Scientists would provide the
information, and policy makers would use
it. For example, the scientists might
provide information on the risk/benefit
balance of the introduction of, say, a new
drug, and the politicians would choose the
acceptable balance for society.
The authors explain why things are
always much more complicated than this.
For example, it is often hard to be clear
about where science ends and policy
begins. It all depends on what you mean
by science. As they cleverly point out,
what we mean by the outcome of a
scientific deliberation is partly determined
by how the Gezondheidsraad goes about
selecting the people it will consult: the
Gezondheidsraad is the legitimator for
what counts as a scientific deliberation,
not just a doer of scientific deliberation.
This kind of point is illustrated through
close observation of a series of passages of
decision-making where the authors where
present during the various stages and
conducted interviews with the principal
parties.
Rather than give an exposition of one
of their cases, it may be more instructive
for those unfamiliar with this kind of
thinking to revisit a recent and well-
publicised case in the United Kingdom.
At the end of October 2009, Professor
David Nutt, head of the Advisory Council
on the Misuse of Drugs, was sacked by the
British Home Secretary. Nutt had publicly
criticised the government for reclassi-
fying cannabis from Class C (less danger-
ous) to Class B (more dangerous and
carrying heavier penalties for possession
and dealing) in contradistinction to his
committee’s recommendations. He said
that his sacking was a ‘‘serious challenge
to the value of science in relation to the
government.’’ Whether Nutt should have
spoken out or not, we can agree that if
Nutt’s brief was to do the ‘‘science,’’ then
the government had misused its policy-
making powers in classifying the drug in a
different way to its appointed committee
of experts. They might have said, ‘‘we
accept the classification of C but we are
going to treat cannabis as a special case
and apply the sanctions of possession and
dealing appropriate to a Class B drug,’’
but they should not have chosen their own
scientific classification. Since I have no
idea what went on in Nutt’s committees
(NC) I am going to speculate, using the
case as a thought experiment. If NC
considered only the physical harm caused
by cannabis then the government was
wrong. If NC considered the psycholog-
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nia—then things are a little less certain
because these illnesses are hard to diag-
nose. If NC considered the harm caused
by reclassification—the imposition of
harsh penalties on small-time dealers with
no previous criminal record, the creation
of a new hardened criminal class, and the
increase in muggings and robberies re-
sulting from an inevitable rise in price of
the commodity—then what? Is that policy
or science? The way the government
handled the advice would, in part, define
what was in and what was out of the
definition of ‘‘science.’’ And how they did
this would, in turn, be a matter of how
they were judging public opinion. Like-
wise, advisory committees will be keeping
an eye on what is credible advice at any
one time and what danger means (car-
driving in the United States kills about
110 ordinary people per day, while space-
shuttle flight kills about seven volunteers
for dangerous missions every five years,
but the latter is considered unacceptably
dangerous while the former is not). Thus,
the sharp division between science and
policy, and indeed politics, cannot be
maintained. The authors show how cases
like this work out in practice.
The observations are interesting but the
lasting contribution of the book is likely to
be the classification of scientific problems
and their treatment, which is found in the
concluding chapter and summarised in
Table C.1 on page 160. This table
encapsulates the way the authors claim
to have resolved the paradox with which
they started. It comprises a four-way
classification of problems and treatments
(exemplified by four aspects of the nano-
technology debate). Simple problems, where
all the necessary evidence is, in principle
available, require input only from techni-
cal experts drawn from within the usual
disciplinary boundaries. Complex problems
begin to depend on a larger range of
unknowns and ill-defined issues. The
example the authors give is nanotechnol-
ogy’s contribution to genetic engineering
and its effect on farming in developing
countries. Here, outside experts should be
drawn into the discussion that will begin to
have more discursive components along
with the technical. Uncertain problems have
aspects that cannot move from unknown
to known by extending current techniques
or even by using external expertise. The
example the authors give is nano-particles’
effect on health. Here, there is a role for
the precautionary principle—the notion
that precautionary measures should be
taken even in the face of scientific
uncertainty if a given action might cause
potentially irreversible threats to public
health or environment—and, given the
unknowns, stakeholders as well as experts
must be drawn in to decide on acceptable
balances of risk. Ambiguous problems depend
clearly on definition and socially sanc-
tioned value judgements. The authors
exemplify nano-technology’s potential
contribution to improving the brain’s
powers, which might be attractive to some
though thought of as ‘‘unnatural’’ or even
blasphemous by others. Here, the general
public has a role to play from the outset.
This kind of approach is extremely
refreshing after a decade or so of attempts
to address society’s problems with tech-
nology by proposing solutions that consist
solely of populist demands for ‘‘more
public participation.’’ Bijker et al. have
realised that science will dissolve away
under the assault of more and more lay
participation in technological judgments.
The classification seems about right,
especially as it keeps participants out
except where they are needed and thus
safeguards the idea of the scientific and
technological expert. I cannot forbear
from saying, however, that Collins and
Evans’s (2007) [1] Rethinking Expertise con-
tains a classification of expertise would
help decide just who belongs in the
categories of disciplinary and outside
expert. Rethinking Expertise, of which the
author of this review is a co-author,
develops a ‘‘Periodic Table of Expertises’’
that turns on how much of the ‘‘tacit
knowledge’’ belonging to a technical
domain has been acquired by the expert
(or non-expert). Certain old classes of
expert are excluded and certain new ones
legitimated.
One of the recommendations of the
authors is that the Gezondheidsraad
continue to hold its deliberations in
private. This is likely to surprise some of
the book’s more ‘‘democracy-minded’’
readers. The authors’ justification is that
scientific arguments should be managed in
a way that allows everyone to speak freely
without fear of premature politicization of
a scientific opinion. The scientific advice,
when it finally emerges, has to appear
consensual or it will no longer look like
scientific advice. Everyone knows, or
should know by now, that scientific
consensus is born out of disagreement
but science isn’t quite science while the
disagreement is going on [2]. (This does
not prevent the possibility of consensus
over how little is fully understood.)
Here, the authors might risk being
misread: what they are saying is that the
debates should not be watched in real time
but we should also bear in mind that if the
idea of ‘‘discussions in private’’ were
interpreted too narrowly, then we would
not have had this study or this book to
reassure us that things were going along
OK. ‘‘Private’’ debates should be moni-
tored by representatives of the public from
time-to-time even if everyone agrees that
what was said cannot be made fully public
until after some delay.
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